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Introduction 
Efficient use of resources is a central topic of economic discussion.  In political economy 
literature, whether and why government policy is “efficient” is a central question  
(Tullock 1967, 1980, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989; Becker 1983, 1985; Grossman and 
Helpman 2001).  This topic also plays a key role in both the conceptual and the applied 
literature on agricultural political economy (Beghin 1990; Beghin and Karp 1991; 
Bullock 1994, 1995; Bullock and Salhofer 2003; Gardner 1993; Rausser and Zusman 
1992; Zusman 1976, Zusman and Amiad 1977.)  In attempt to address this question at its 
roots, I modify the well-known Arrow-Debreu private ownership economy.  The key 
result of the Arrow-Debreu model is the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 
Economics, which states the conditions under which competitive equilibria will be Pareto 
efficient.  In my modification of the Arrow-Debreu model, I allow property rights to be 
violable.  The result is that equilibria tend not to be Pareto efficient.  The new model’s 
implications provide insight into why “institutions” (rules, constitutions, governments, 
etc.) may exist:  to lower the transactions costs of cooperation between interest groups, 
since the noncooperative social equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. 
 
 
An Arrow-Debreu Private Ownership Economy   
The General I×J×L Model 
Following Mas-Collel, et al. (1995, pp. 546-561), consider an abstract Arrow-Debreu 
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⎟.  In this economy 
each consumer i = 1, . . . , I is characterized by a consumption set Xi ⊆ R
L, and a   3
preference relation f
~i
.  Each consumer i commands an endowment bundle ωi ∈ R+
L, and 
has a right to a share θij ∈ [0, 1] of each firm j’s profits.  Each firm j = 1, . . . , J is 
characterized by a production possibilities set (also called a “technology”) Yj ⊆ R
L. The 
feasible set of allocations in this economy is defined as  
 
 

























LI +J () ,  
where xi = (x1i, . . . , xLi) is i’s consumption bundle and yj = (y1j, . . . , yLj) is firm j’s netput 
vector (with negative values of ykj implying that firm j is using commodity k as an input 










 (Mas-Colell 1995, p. 47).  Any Arrow-Debreu economy has a utilities 
possibilities set, formally defined as  
 
 
U = u1,K,uI () ∈ R+
I : ∃ x1,K,xI,y1,K,yJ () ∈ A, where ui = ui xi ( ) for i =1,K,I {} . 
The Pareto frontier of the Arrow-Debreu economy is defined as 
  UP = u1,K,uI () ∈U : there is no  ′ u1,K, ′ uI ( )∈U such that  ′ ui ≥ ui for all i and  ′ ui > ui for some i  {} . 
 
The question at hand is whether we should expect a society to position itself on its 
Pareto frontier.  And by what means would a society thus position itself?  Do political 
and/or governmental actions move an economy toward its Pareto frontier, or away from 
it?  Of course, in the economic literature there is a long debate on the “efficiency” of 
government intervention.  My goal in this paper is to go back to the basics of efficiency, 
in an attempt to throw some new light on this old debate.   4
An Illustration with the 2×2×2 Model 
For the purposes of illustration in our upcoming discussion, consider an Arrow-Debreu 
economy with I = 2 consumers, J = 2 firms, and L = 2 goods. We will index the firms 
with A and B, the consumers with C and D, and the goods with 1 and 2.  We assume that 
good 1 is used as an input into the production of good 2, but not vice-versa.  
Consumption space for consumer i ∈ A,B { } is  Xi ⊆ R+
2 , and consumption space for the 
economy is  XC × XD ⊆ R+
4 .  Each consumer is assumed endowed with some amount ωi of 
good 1, any portion of which he or she may sell to firms or consume.  Consumers are not 
endowed with good 2; rather, they must buy good 2 from firms, which produce it using 
good 1 as an input.  Yj is the technology of firm j ∈ {A, B}, and is defined using a 
production function:  Yj = y1j,y2 j () : y2 j ≤ fj y1j ( ) {} .  The production possibilities set for 
the economy is  
  Y = y1A,y2A,y1B,y2B () : y1A + y1B ≤ y1, y1A,y2A ( )∈YA, y1B,y2B ( )∈YB {} .   
The set of feasible allocations is 
Z = x1C,x2C () , x1D,x2D () , y1A,y2A () , y1B,y2B ( ) () ∈ R+
8 : { y1A,y2A,y1B,y2B ( )∈Y,
x1C + x1D = y1 − y1A − y1B, x2C + x2D = fA y1A () + fB y1B () }.
 
The set of feasible allocations shows that after the production process is completed, the 
amount y1 − y1A − y1B remains of good 1 for consumption, and the amount y2 has been 
produced and is available for consumption. (For simplicity, we assume that all production 
must be consumed and cannot be thrown away.)  Assuming that y1A + y1B < y1, netput 
vectors  y1A,y2A = fA y1A () ()  and   y1B,y2B = fB y1B ( ) ( ) imply that aggregate production of 
good 2 is  fA y1A () + fB y1B () , and that y1 − y1A − y1B of good 1 has not been used as an   5
input, and so remains for consumers. If none of good 2 is thrown away, then a 
technologically feasible production plan consists of four nonnegative real numbers: 
y1A,y1B,y2A,y2B () = y1A,y1B, fA y1A () , fB y1B ( ) ( ).  To shorten the notation, we may refer to 
such a plan simply by the pair of numbers showing input usage of each firm:  y1A,y1B () .   
Labeling an arbitrary feasible production plan  y1A
F ,y1B
F ( ), the accompanying 
consumption possibilities set is 
Cy 1A
F ,y1B
F () = x1C,x2C () , x1D,x2D ( ) () ∈ R+
4 : x1C + x1D ≤ y1 − y1A
F − y1A
F , {
x2C + x2D ≤ fA y1A
F () + fB y1B () } ,
  
which can be represented conveniently in two dimensions by the Edgeworth box 
Ey 1A
F ,y1B
F () shown in figure 1.  The dimensions of the box are y1 − y1A
F − y1B
F  by 
fA y1A () + fB y1B () .  
 















Figure 1.  Arbitrary feasible production plan  y1A
F ,y1B
F ( ) and corresponding Edgeworth box 
Ey 1A
F ,y1B
F () .  
← Good 1 → 
↑ 




F = fA y1A







The preferences of consumer j ∈ {C, D} are represented by a utility function 
uj x1j,x2 j () : R+
2 → R+.  The vector of utility functions maps the consumption 
possibilities set for the production plan  y1A
F ,y1B




F () = uC x1C,x2C () ,uD x1D,x2D ( ) () : x1C,x2C ( ), x1D,x2D ( ) ( )∈ Cy 1A
F ,y1B
F () {}  
The utilities possibilities set for the economy is the union of the utility possibilities sets 
for every feasible production plan: 
  U = uC x1C,x2C () ,uD x1D,x2D () () : x1C,x2C ( ), x1D,x2D ( ), y1A,x2A ( ), y1B,y2B ( ) ( )∈ Z {} . 
The Pareto frontier for the economy is then defined as, 
  UP = u1,K,uI () ∈U : there is no  ′ u1,K, ′ uI ( )∈U such that  ′ ui ≥ ui for all i and  ′ ui > ui for some i  {} . 




















U = uC x1C,x2C ( ),uD x1D,x2D ( ) ( ): {
x1C,x2C () , x1D,x2D () , y1A,y1B () , y2A,y2B () () ∈ A}
UP = uC,uD () ∈U : there is no  ′ uC, ′ uD ( )∈U  {
such that  ′ ui ≥ ui for all i ∈ C,D {}  and  ′ ui > ui for some i ∈ C,D {} }
The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics states 
that a competitive economy places itself on the Pareto frontier 
in the absence of government intervention.   9
Equilibrium in An Arrow-Debreu Economy with Inviolable Property Rights 
An equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreau economy is a list of real numbers, consisting of a 
price vector and a feasible allocation ((1, p), z ) such that the following properties hold:  
(i)  producers are profit maximizing, (ii) consumers are utility maximizing, and (iii)  
markets clear (Mas-Colell, pp. 547-548).  Since firm i must be maximizing profits, then 
firm i buys an amount of input, y1i at which the slope of its production function (its 
marginal rate of transformation, MRT), equals the slope of its iso-profit lines, 1/p.  This 
implies that, given the total amount of the input used by both firms, the price mechanism 
allocates the use of the input such that aggregate production is maximized.  
Let us examine the geometric implications of an equilibrium in which some 
arbitrary amount y1
F  < y1 of good 1 is used in aggregate by firms A and B as the 
production input.   In such a case, since in equilibrium each firm is maximizing profits, 
then for firm A and firm B marginal rates of transformation 
MRTA y1A
F , fA y1A




 and MRTB y1B
F , fB y1B




 are equal to the price 
ratio 1/p, and so equal to each other. Given that a total amount y1
F  of the input is used by 
both firms combined, the production possibilities frontier is 
PPF y1
F () = y2A,y2B () : y2A = fA y1A ( ),y2B = fB y1B ( ),y1A + y1B = y1
F {} .  (See figure 3.)  
Among all  y1A,y1B ()  combinations satisfying y1A + y1B = y1
F , the combination  y1A
F ,y1B
F ()  
maximizes each firm’s profits individually, and also maximizes aggregate production of 
good 2.  This occurs in figure 3 at point F, where  y2A
F ,y2B
F ( )= fA y1A
F ( ), fB y1B
F () ( ), and 
where the slope of the production possibilities frontier PPF y1
F ( ), which is   10
−
MRTB y1B
F , fB y1B
F () ()
MRTA y1A









, is –1.  Similarly, choosing another 
arbitrary amount y1
H  < y1
F  < y1, if this is to be the aggregate input use in equilibrium, 
then the firm’s input usages must use y1A
H , and y1B
H , implying production 
y2A
H ,y2B
H () = fA y1A
H () , fB y1B
H () () , meaning that if in equilibrium aggregate input usage is 
y1
H , then production must be at point H in figure 1, where the slope of the production 
possibilities frontier PPF y1
H () , which is −
MRTB y1B
H , fB y1B
H ( ) ( )
MRTA y1A










–1.  Thus, as we let y1  vary between 0 and y1 , the locus of points through JHFK in 
figure 3 shows all the values of  y2A,y2B () where the PPFs have slope of –1.  These points 
are all the candidates for the equilibrium output combination  y2A
* ,y2B


















Figure 3.  Possible output decisions in an Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium lie on 
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MRTA y1A
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Figure 4.  Edgeworth Box representing consumption possibilities set Cy 1A
F ,y1B
F ()  in an 
Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium.  The set of Pareto efficient consumption 
possibilities,  XPE y1A
F ,y1B
F () , is represented by the “contract curve,” GG.
← Good 1 → 
↑ 
Good 2  
↓  y2A
F + y2B
F = fA y1A










Properties of a Competitive Equilibrium:  The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 
Economics in an Arrow-Debreu Economy with Inviolable Property Rights 
The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics states that as long as preferences 
are non-satiated, any competitive equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu economy results in a 
Pareto efficient allocation—that is, in a welfare outcome on the Pareto frontier.  The 
geometry of the First Fundamental Theorem is well-known:  at an interior competitive 
equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu economy, all consumers’ marginal rates of substitution 
between every pair of goods must be equalized, all firms’ marginal rates of 
transformation between every pair of goods must be equalized, and every consumer’s 
marginal rate of substitution must equal every firm’s marginal rate of transformation for 
all pairs of goods (Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 564)).  
We continue to consider a feasible allocation  x1C
F ,x2C
F ( ), x1D
F ,x2D
F ( ), y1A
F ,y2A
F () , y1B
F ,y2B
F ( ) ( ).  
In an interior competitive equilibrium, consumer utility maximization implies that every 
consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between good 2 and good 1 must equal the 
negative of the price ratio, -p, and so all consumers’ MRSs must equal each other.  That 
is, given the dimensions of the Edgeworth box, the competitive equilibrium amounts of 
consumption must lie along the contract curve GG in figure 4, the locus of points at 
which  consumer C’s indifference curves are tangent to D’s indifference curves.   
That is, given a production plan  y1A,y1B ( ), the utility possibilities set is the mapping of 
the consumption possibilities set (the Edgeworth box) into utility space using the vector 
of utility functions  uC x1C,x2C () ,uD x1D,x2D ( ) ( ).  In the same way, given the production   14
plan  y1A,y1B () , the Pareto frontier is the mapping of the set of Pareto efficient feasible 
consumption plans into utility space. 
 
A Private Ownership Economy with Violable Property Rights   
In the type of Arrow-Debreu economy reviewed in the previous section, all property 
rights are given exogenously and are inviolable.  Consumers own their endowments.  
Firms own their production.  They give these up only voluntarily, in exchange for goods 
of greater value to them. 
Let us generalize the idea of the Arrow-Debreu economy by assuming that 
property rights need not be inherently inviolable.  We can imagine such an economy in 
which firms may use inputs not only to produce outputs, but also may resort to a different 
kind of technology, which enables a firm to use inputs to steal other firms’ outputs.  
Along the same vein, firms my use inputs for security, to make it more costly for other 
firms to steal their output.  For example, imagine a firm that can produce food by hiring 
labor, land, human capital (expertise in farming), and physical capital (tractors, fuel, 
fertilizer, etc.).  Or, the firm might steal food from another firm, by hiring labor, human 
capital (expertise in thievery), and physical capital (bolt cutters).  The later firm may use 
labor and physical capital (a lock, a chain, a storage bin) to raise the costs to the former 
firm of stealing.  For simplicity, we will assume that consumers are not able to steal.  The 
simply own shares in firms that may steal.   
In an Arrow-Debreu economy with inviolable property rights, the technology 
describes the production processes:  how goods can be transformed into each other, 
producing outputs from inputs.  With property rights violable, theft and security play   15
roles in the economy’s technology.  Continuing to consider the 2×2×2 economy, we now 
denote the production technologies with a superscript P:  The firms’ production 





P ( ): y2A
P ≤ fA y1A




P () : y2B
P ≤ fB y1B
P () {} .
 
Firm A’s theft technology and Firm B’s security technology can be defined using a 
theft/security function gAB, which shows how the amount y2AB  that A steals from B 
depends on the amount y1A
T  of the input that A dedicates to thievery, and the amount y1B
S  
of the input that B dedicates to security: 













Similarly, firm B’s theft technology and Firm A’s security technology can be defined 
using the theft/security function gBA, which shows how the amount y2BA  that B steals 
from A depends on the amount y1B
T  of the input that B dedicates to thievery, and the 
amount y1A
S  of the input that A dedicates to security: 













Now we define the economy’s technology by a production, thievery, and security 
possibilities set, 
 






S ,y2B () : y2A ≤ fA y1A
P ( )+ gAB y1A
T ,y1B
S ( )− gBA y1A
S ,y1B
T () , {
y2B ≤ fB y1B
P () − gAB y1A
T ,y1B
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The production, thievery and security possibilities set reflects that at the end of the 
production, thievery, and security processes, firm j has purchased from consumers (who 
are also basic resource owners) and used for production, thievery, or security the 
following amount of the input:  y1j
P + y1j
T + y1j
S .  Firm j has available and can sell the 
amount of good 2 that it produced, plus the amount it stole from firm k ≠ j, minus the 
amount that firm k stole from it:  y2 j
P + y2 jk
T − y2kj
S . 


















S ,y2B () ∈ % Y,












The utility possibilities set and the Pareto frontier in the economy with violable 
property rights are the same as in the corresponding economy with inviolable property 
rights.  In fact, the economy with inviolable property rights is simply a special case of the 
economy with property rights, in which gAB y1A
T ,y1B
S ( )≡ gBA y1A
S ,y1B
T ( )= 0 for all  y1A
T ,y1B
S ()  
and for all  y1A
S ,y1B
T () .  That is, if the theft technologies are completely ineffective—if 
investing resources into theft brings no booty—then property rights are inviolable.  
Moreover, any production plan feasible when property rights are inviolable is also 
feasible when property rights are violable—provided that in the latter case no resources 
are spent on theft or security. 
   17
Equilibrium when Property Rights Are Violable?  
As with the Arrow-Debreu economy will inviolable property rights, in the model with 
violable property rights we define equilibrium as a price and allocation combination 
under which each firm is maximizing profits subject to its technology, each consumer is 
maximizing utility subject to his or her budget constraint, and each market clears. The 
presence of the theft and security technologies changes the equilibrium of an Arrow-
Debreu economy in important ways.  In general, a profit-maximizing firm j will dedicate 
resources to theft and security.  See figure 5.  There, given that firm B is purchasing input 
amounts y1B
T* for theft and y1B
S* for security, the marginal returns to use of the input for 
firm A are equal whether used for production, theft, or security, and positive amounts of 
the input are used for each purpose. 
 










































slope = -1/p* 
slope = -1/p* 






S*   19
Is Equilibrium Pareto Inefficient when Property Rights Are Violable? If So, Can 
Government and Politics Fix It? 
The economic literature on efficiency and government intervention is rather 
schizophrenic.  On the one hand, there is a large literature about rent dissipation, which 
which claims that the traditional Harberger dead weight triangles of government 
intervention only begin to account for its inefficiency, since lobbying efforts used by 
interest groups to secure favorable government intervention are in themselves wasteful.  
(e.g., Tullock 1967, 1980, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989).  A seminal political economy model 
(Becker 1983) often cited as a theoretical basis to believe in the efficiency of government 
policy, in fact has a Pareto inefficient equilibrium.  Becker hypothesized intuitively that 
the government intervention we witness should be Pareto efficient, or else it would lose 
political support (Becker 1983).  Yet, Becker’s formal model is of a one-shot 
noncooperative game, and in fact its equilibrium is generally Pareto inefficient, as are 
many one-shot noncooperative games.  A series of political economy models by  
Grossman and Helpman (see Grossman and Helpman 2001, chapter 7) are also 
noncooperative game models, but give one agent (the government) a first-move 
advantage, which provides the result that their equilibria are Pareto efficient.  Numerous 
applied works in the agricultural political literature assume either implicitly or explicitly 
that government policy is Pareto efficient (see Bullock 1994, 1995, 1996).  In the current 
paper, my aim is to begin addressing these seemingly contradictory results in the 
literature on the Pareto efficiency of government policy.  I’ve tried to begin approaching 
this problem at its roots, by imagining a society even more primitive than the Arrow-
Debreu economy.   20
When property rights are violable, do we expect a competitive equilibrium to take 
the economy to its Pareto frontier?  The answer in general is no, not if people cannot 
manage to play some sort of cooperative game; theft and security result from 
noncooperative play from economic agents, and they waste resources.  When resources 
are wasted, then the economy must travel to the interior of its utility possibilities frontier.   
If everyone refused to steal, then no one would need security, and aggregate 
income in the economy would rise; but it may well be in each firm’s private interest to 
invest in thievery, security, or both.  This fundamental aspect of human society, that 
property rights are violable, is at least one of the forces that leads to the necessity of 
cooperation among individuals to form groups, and to cooperation among groups to 
develop the institutions that we call politics and government..  21
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